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the editor. Accidents* 
1. EOT crane 
The  fitter and  an  apprentice  had  been  detailed  to 
check  the  holst coupling  pins  and  rubbers  on  the 
overhead  cranes;  they  had  also  been  instructed  to 
check the brake shoes and adjust as necessary. The 
accident occurred In  a foundry bay serviced by three 
cranes.  They  completed  work  on  one  of  the  end 
cranes. The apprentice then remained on the working 
platform of that crane whilst the fitter went into the 
crane  cab  and  drove  the crane  towards  the  middle 
crane.  Their  tackle  was  then  transferred  from  the 
working platform of the end crane to the working plat-
form of the middle crane. The apprentice crossed onto 
the  middle crane  and  the  fitter then  drove  the  end 
crane to its access platform at the far end of the bay. 
Meanwhile the apprentice drove the middle crane to 
Its own  access  platform.  The  fitter returned  to  the 
middle crane  via  Its access  ladder. The  power was 
switched off and both men climbed onto the top of the 
crane to carry out the required work. This completed, 
the fitter Instructed the apprentice to climb down into 
the crane cab and move the crane towards the third 
crane In the bay on which they were to work. Once in 
the crane cab, the apprentice turned on the power and 
began to move the crane slowly. He heard a crash and 
saw that the fitter was slumped on top of the crane 
cab his body hanging partly through an upper access 
hatch. The crane had been moved approximately 15ft. 
The  apprentice  summoned  help  and  the  fitter was 
freed but was found to be dead on arrival at hospital. 
Investigations and conclusions 
Investigations showed  that the fitter had  sustained 
fatal Injuries as a result of his head being trapped bet-
ween  an  Isolator box on the top of the middle crane 
and a roof support beam. In order to carry out the job 
assigned to him it was unnecessary for the fitter to 
move  the  crane  although  It  might  have  been  ne-
cessary  to  test  the  holst  or  the  cross  travel 
mechanism. He  had apparently decided to move the 
crane In  order to transfer himself and his equipment 
to another crane. This unorthodox practice had appa-
rently  been  adopted  by  maintenance  fitters  and 
electricians prior to the accident without the knowl-
edge or approval of their supervisors. It was, and is, 
specifically  forbidden  in  the  rules  governing  such 
work. 
There was an Isolator switch on the working platform 
but the deceased did not have sufficient time In which 
to operate it. 
Recommendations/action 
1. Personnel will not be permitted to stand, or work, on 
tho top of an EOT crane whilst It Is long travelling. 
2. If  personnel  are  undertaking  maintenance  work 
which will place them In  a position of danger from 
* The Editorial Committee of tho Bulletin draws the attention of read-
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tho  movement  of  the  crane  on  which  they  are 
working, or from the movement of other cranes In 
the bay or adjoining bays, then the correct Isolation 
procedures must be agreed and Implemented. 
3. All  jobs which  require  personnel  to  ride  on  EOT 
cranes  will  be  Identified and  safe working  proce-
dures  for  such  jobs  will  be  prepared  and  imple-
mented. These procedures will ensure that person-
nel are In safe positions. 
4. Trapping  hazards,  related  to the movement of all 
EOT cranes to be Identified as a matter of urgency. 
5. A permit to work system Incorporating a purpose 
designed document to be Introduced. 
6. The  removal,  or reduction In  height, of equipment 
on  working platforms of EOT  cranes to be  under-
taken where practical. Any remaining hazards to be 
clearly  marked  and  appropriate  warning  notices 
posted. 
7. The rule prohibiting persons under 18 years of age 
being trained as crane drivers to be extended to in-
clude apprentices. 
8. The training of apprentices to be examined, particu-
larly with regard to training for crane driving and in-
struction In safe working procedures and practices. 
9. A time limit and order of priorities to be agreed for 
the Implementation of the above recommendations. 
2. Handling with a 
fork·lift truck 
A metal cabin (3.21  m x 1.54 m x 2.55 m), which was on 
the floor between two sheds In the area Inaccessible 
to the overhead travelling cranes, had to be moved by 
a few metres by a team of two fitters In order to bring 
It within reach of one of these cranes. 
To  this end, a fork-lift truck was brought up and the 
forks Inserted under the cabin. Because of the cabin's 
width and bulk, Its top had to be  lashed to the top of 
the truck's mast. 
One of the two men was therefore on the roof of the 
cabin, to which a lug had been welded to provide an 
anchoring point for a rope.  The  other workman was 
standing on the control panel of the truck between the 
mast and the roll-over bar In order to assist with the 
lashing. 
He  had put one foot on a cross-bar of the mast and 
reached out to take hold of the rope. As he was per-
forming this movement, or returning to his previous 
position,  the  other  foot  touched  the  control  lever 
which caused the mast to be raised towards the roll-
over bar. His thorax was thus crushed just below the 
heart between the bar and the mast and he died on his 
way to hlspltal. 
Measures taken 
1. The  regulations were revised and drawn to the at-
tention of operators. 
1 2. Fork-lift trucks were fitted with a windscreen (and 
wipers, since the trucks are also used outside the 
sheds) in order to ensure that if, in breach of regula-
tions, operators do climb onto the cross bars they 
cannot touch the controls. 
1. Roll·over bar 
2. Victim's position 
3.  Rope-attached lug welded to the cabin 
4. Point of crushing 
3. Electric furnaces 
Early on a Sunday morning at 0.15 a.m. while the 12t 
electric furnace was in operation, the person acting as 
foreman decided to 'push in' the scrap adhering to the 
furnace  wall.  To  this  end,  he  shut  off the  furnace 
(interrupting the electric power suply and thus caus-
ing  automatic retraction of the electrodes) and  had 
the two doors opened. 
This  was  a  straightforward  and  routine  operation, 
which was carried out in accordance with the normal 
procedure, namely: 
(I)  the foreman shuts off the furnace from the control 
panel located at (1); 
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5. Cabin to be moved 
6. Crossbar 
7. Crossbar 
8. Mast control lever 
9. Forks 
(ii)  a furnace operative opens the two doors from the 
control station located at (2); 
(ill) together with another operative, he looks through 
the two open doors to check whether any scrap Is 
sticking or caught on the cylindrical internal wall 
of the furnace; 
(iv) If this Is the case, the operative takes a push-in bar 
lying on the floor at (3) and 'pokes' the Inside of the 
furnace to cause this scrap to fall into the bath; 
(v)  the  doors are  then  reclosed and  the  furnace  re-
started; 
(vi) for these operations, the operatives must be wear-
Ing protective clothing. Doors 
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In the present case, after the furnace had been shut 
off the doors were opened by an electrician/crane op-
erator who was undergoing training as  a production 
supervisor  while  a  furnace  operative  bent  down  to 
pick up a bar and prepared to gush in the scrap if ne-
cessary. 
It is assumed that, as soon as the doors were opened, 
scrap fell  into the bath and  there was a very violent 
emission of flame through the open slagging door. 
The  operative  standing at (4)  was wearing  overall  a 
helmet,  goggles,  an  aluminized  jacket/coat  and 
gauntlets. He was burned on the face, on the back of 
the neck (between the jacket and helmet) and on  the 
shoulder, mainly when the flame was deflected from 
the wall. He ran towards the access and escape stairs 
(5),  and  was  Intercepted  by  the  foreman,  who  ex-
tinguished  his  burning  clothing.  He  suffered  burns 
over 4% of his body but no damage to the eyes. 
The  electrician/crane operator, who was at (6),  suff-
ered burns on the front of his body to the face, hands 
and forearms. He ran towards the access and escape 
stairs (7), and received assistance on reaching the bot-
tom of these stairs. He suffered second and third-de-
gree burns over 16% of his body, but no damage to the 
eyes. 
The enquiry covered the operating procedures: charg-
ing of the furnace, melting and in particular the push-
In, deslagging and rabbling operations. 
Transformer 
For these operations, it is necessary to open the two 
doors in order to: 
(i)  look inside the furnace; 
(ii)  knock down any adhering scrap; 
(ill) carry out deslagging or rabbling. 
There is a risk only when workers are looking into the 
furnace. This risk is not eliminated by waiting before 
approaching the furnace in order to look inside. It is 
not possible to observe the inside of the furnace ad-
equately unless the doors are fully opened. 
It was decided to take tho following measures. By now 
they have  been  implemented or preparatory studies 
are in hand. 
(i)  Staff to be reminded of the safety and operating in-
structions  and  work  on  the  platform  to  be  or-
ganized by the supervisor. 'No personnel to be  in 
the vicinity unless absolutely essential.' 
(II)  Personal protection 
Staff to be reminded of the need to wear protective 
equipment and safety clothing. 
The  equipment exists but it must be  recognized 
that we have difficulty in ensuring that It is worn. 
The  question of wearing fireproofed overalls has 
been raised. For electric-furnace operation (where 
no  metal  can  splash  onto  the  platform),  there 
seems  to  be  no  need  for  fireproofed  overalls, 
which would cause extra inconvenience. 
3 (Iii) Overall protection 
The possibility of using a mobile screen with ob-
servation slits or mesh has been considered. The 
necessary design work will be carried out and en-
4. am fall 
A  workman  was  engaged  In  relagging  a  duct  at  a 
height of 40m  on an  Installation. In  order to perform 
his task, the workman crossed the safety barrier of the 
scaffolding and  climbed onto two planks projecting 
beyond Its edge. The planks tipped over and the work-
man fell a distance of 8m. 
Results of the accident: head and spinal Injuries. 
Fault tree analysis of the accident 
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5. Firestarters 
British Steel Corporation* 
Steelmaking  has  many  'firestarters' in  its own  pro-
cesses and  operations. In  this section, we  show the 
main sources of fires- and the materials which most 
often assist In spreading the fire. 
The  most obvious firestarters are  liquid metal, slag, 
hot coke, hot slabs, and so on. Equally obviously, we 
have to be  extra careful to ensure they do not come 
into  contact  with  material  which  burns  easily  and 
quickly and spreads the fire. 
But many other fires are started by routine operations 
we  should  be  able  to control.  Burning  and  welding 
operations, for example,  have caused almost one  In 
four of the fire damage Incidents during the last few 
years. And burning and welding are largely under the 
control of the Individual to follow the safety rules, spe-
cially drawn up to cut fire risks. 
• Situation 1980-831n Safety, Aprll1984. 
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qulrles will be made at other similar plants to find 
out what measures are taken elsewhere and to in-
troduce them If It seems appropriate. 
Action envisaged 
(I)  Use of personal protection to be reconsidered. 
(II)  Scaffolding  to  be  suitable  for  the  work  to  be 
carried out. 
(ill) Personnel carrying out work at a height to be made 
aware of the risks Involved. 
(lv) Special  procedures to be  adopted for organizing 
work  sites  where  scaffolding  Is  used  and  ac-
ceptance to be carried out by the various users of 
such equipment. 
Workman  Workman 
crossed  standing on 
~  ~  f•  safety  projecting 
barrier  plank 
Casualty 
Bmfall  '-f. requiring 
hospital 
treatment 
No personal  ~  protection 
In the same way,  problems connected with electrical 
equipment or friction can be cut down to size by better 
maintenance and  by  Individuals paying  more  atten-
tion to detail. 
When fire starts, the materials which can cause It to 
spread most rapidly are the ones we need to be most 
careful  about.  Those  listed  here  are  the  main  'fire-
spreaders', showing the proportion of major fire Inci-
dents in which they are Involved In our works: 
Oil and grease  22% 
Electric cables  36% 
Rubber and plastics  13% 
Other flammable liquids, 
gases, vapours, solids  13% 
We have a great many of these materials In our works 
- because they play a vital role in the running of the 
businesses. 
Some aspects of fire prevention can be dealt with only 
by  proper design of plant or equipment. But In many cases, risks with existing plant can be stopped or cut 
by individual employees taking positive and practical 
action. 
Positive  fire  prevention  demands  that  all  such  ma-
terials are: 
(I)  used under carefully controlled conditions; 
40% 
Flrostartors 
D  % Incidence 
~  % Estimated total fire loss 
6. Killed by a falling transfer ladle 
At the start of a maintenance shift an empty 100t ca-
pacity transfer ladle weighing 49.5t was lifted In  the 
mixer building by a travelling crane equipped with a 
lifting beam with two flat hooks. The ladle was lifted 
to the level of tho south platform In the mixer building 
(9.5m).  As  the  foreman  walked  on  the  Intermediate 
platform and  underneath tho ladle,  the  crane  driver 
shifted the crab to move tho ladle. At this moment the 
ladle slipped off the hook at the side opposite to the 
driver's cabin,  fell  on  the foreman  and  tho platform 
and dragged them to tho ground (see diagram). 
Tho accident was caused by tho fact that one of the 
lugs was only resting on tho point of tho hook; this 
had  not boon  noticed  by  tho  crane driver when the 
hooks were  engaged (one side after another) nor by 
tho victim who had been asked by tho crane driver If 
tho hook was properly engaged. Tho victim was stand-
Ing  In  a position where  he  could only see  the hook 
from  tho back,  I.e.  edgeways on,  and did not notice 
what had happened. 
Measures taken 
1. The  special  directives  for  engaging  lifting  gear 
hooks In the ladle lugs and checks to be carried out 
are being tightened up. 
2. A TV camera to help the crane driver to see objects 
obscured from view (second lug) Is being tested. 
(il)  kept away from sources of Ignition; 
(Ill) used without spillage; 
(iv) cleaned up quickly If spillage does happen. 
All  these  are  safety hazards.  But  they are  also ex-
amples of wastage, which Itself costs British Stool -
unnecessarily - huge amounts every year. 
Flrosproaders 
D% Incidence 
~%  Estimated total fire loss 
5 3. The  possibilities  of  fitting  a  device  to  indicate 
whether the lugs are  fully engaged at the base of 
the hook (electrical contact load cell, pressure de· 
tector, etc.) and to give the crane driver a signal con-
firming proper engagement Is being effected. 
4. The shape of the hook point will be modified to in· 
crease the opening and facilitate engagement with· 
out entailing any loss of strength or risk of disen· 
gagement when the ladle is tipped. 
7. Fatality caused by a part blown off 
during a pressure test on a hydraulic 
lifting device 
A cylinder of an hydraulic lifting device with a leak at 
the seal of its lower end cover had been  returned to 
the workshop to be repaired. After replacing the faulty 
seal,  the  workmen were  carrying out a  leakage test 
with a test rig consisting of an  oil reservoir,  a com-
pressed-air volumetric pump with a pressure limiter 
on  the delivery side, an  isolating gate and  a T-pioce 
with a pressure gauge. Tho seal plugs of the lower and 
upper parts of tho cylinder had been replaced, on the 
side opposite the oil inlet, by 3/4"G/1/8"G  reducers, 
onto which wore screwed special fittings, which are 
standard parts used for blooding tho cylinder or fitting 
a pressure gauge. When the pressure was at 300 bars, 
tho special fitting on the upper section of the cylinder 
was suddenly blown off as a workman was passing 
nearby and struck him at the base of the neck. 
The  enquiry  and  the  pressure  tests  carried  out  on 
those  special  fittings  Indicate  that  tho  most  likely 
cause of the accident was that the part was over-tight· 
ened,  perhaps  with  an  unsuitable spanner,  and  its 
thread damaged. 
Action taken 
1. Compliance with tho following recommendations: 
(a) Tho various parts should be fitted in tho order in 
which they are normally tightened. In tho case in 
point, tho 3/4"G/1/8"G reducer must be tightened 
before tho special fitting. 
(b) Tho  appropriate  flat  or  polygonal  standard 
spanners for tho parts to be tightened should be 
used.  Adjustable spanners should not be  used 
on small-diameter threads. 
(c) During  hydraulic testing of a cylinder, tho part 
not being tested should be  completely drained 
before any pressure is applied. 
(d) The pressure ratings of tho various accessories 
on  an  Installation should be  carefully chocked 
against the service or testing pressures. 
2. The fitters' department will issue short notes with a 
commentary  on  tho  most  important  basic  safety 
rules  to be  obeyed  when  working on  hydraulic or 
pneumatic equipment. 
8. Falling coil at the banding station 
The tables for tho coils which are to be banded are sot 
In  tho  shop-floor concreto  and  consist  of flat  bars 
forming  a  V-shapod  cradle  in  which  tho open  coils 
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rest. Tho bars are spaced at regular intervals through 
which  tho  bands  can  be  passed.  The  coils  are  de· 
posited  and  removed  from  these  tables  by  lifting 
trucks with a handling boom. All these operations are 
carried out with tho coil axis in the horizontal plane. 
The sequence of operations is as follows: 
(i)  A lifting truck places the coil to be  banded on a 
table, reverses to withdraw its boom and then re-
turns to tho shop. 
(II)  The  bander  fastens  the  coil  with  bands  passed 
through Its centre (usually three) and occasionally 
adds  one  or  two  bands  passing  round  the  cir-
cumference. 
(ill) The truck returns to pick up the banded coil by in-
sorting  Its boom  through  the centre,  raising  the 
coil and reversing. 
The accident occurred during this last phase of pick· 
lng up a banded coil. As the coil was being raised, It 
slipped off the boom and fell over, striking the band-
er's legs. 
Causes of tho accident 
(I)  The boom had probably not been inserted far en-
ough into the centro of tho coil. 
(li)  There  was  grease  on  the  whole  of the  coil  and 
since there was heavy rain on tho day of tho acci-
dent the boom was wet. It was therefore easy for 
the load to slip. 
(Iii) As It fell, the coil struck tho end of tho table on tho 
side to the bander. This may have contributed to 
Its tipping over. 
Action taken 
(I)  The  truck drivers wore  reminded of their Instruc-
tions and given refresher training. 
(il)  The length and height of the banding tables were 
altered to ensure that the coils could not tip over If 
they fell directly onto the table. 
(iii) The tables and banding equipment were moved to 
allow the banders more room between their work 
station and the shop wall so that they can escape 
more easily In  the event of an  incident, e.g. over-
harsh  braking  of a  truck,  brake  failure,  misjudg-
ment when delivering and picking up the coils. 
9. Filter cover blown off at natural 
gas pressure-reducing station 
Before the resumption of work at a bloom reheating 
furnace,  one of tho persons  in  charge of the  Heavy 
Products Department asked the Energy Department to 
change the natural gas filters. 
These filters are replaced on every bypass line of tho 
pressure-reducing station upstream of the 15/3-bar re-
ducing valve. 
The  pressure-reducing  station  had  been  isolated 
when tho furnace was taken off gas a month earlier, 
with tho Installations shut down In  accordance with 
the established operating procedure, i.e. with the Inlet 
and outlet valves locked In the closed position and the 
vent between these two valves open. 
In  the section of line on which tho filter was located, 
however, the gas pressure remained at 15 bars, since the pressure-reducing valve acted as a shut-off device 
and the valve underneath the filter had not been op-
ened. In order to change the filter, the two workmen re-
moved the bolts securing the cover. When only three 
bolts remained to be  loosened, the cover was blown 
off the filter and out of the pressure-reducing station 
by  the  gas  pressure,  while  the  two  workmen  were 
struck In the face by a stream of dust. One operative 
received Injuries to both eyes and facial lacerations. 
Proposed measures 
(i)  Accident to be explained to the workforce and re-
minder Issued about the isolation procedure. 
(ii)  Working party to be set up to develop means of In-
creasing the safety awareness of the operatives. 
0  Pressure-reducing valve 
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10. Oil filter cover torn from its 
mountings 
Outlet valve 
A foreman, two mechanics and two basement workers 
were repairing the oil filter for the lubrication system 
for the bearings of a five-stand cold-rolling mill. 
The filter, which Is of the rotary type Is located in the 
oil reservoir.  As It  had  not been  working properly, it 
had  not  been  In  service  for  10  days  and  several 
cursory examinations had  produced no means of re-
pairing it. It was thus decided to empty the reservoir of 
oil,  to  remove  the  cover,  which  has  a  diameter of 
870mm  and  was  secured  by 15  tie-rods,  and  to ex-
amine the mechanism. 
One of the workers Isolated the filter from the rest of 
the  Installation  In  service  by  closing  the  Inlet  and 
outlet valves. The reservoir was emptied by opening a 
3/4"  valve  on  the  bleed  pipe.  As  the  oil  was  only 
running out slowly under gravity the foreman decided 
to speed up the process by having the compressed air 
valve opened to build up the pressure at the top of the 
filter and force the oil into the tank via a hose fixed to 
the escape pipe. 
After about 5 minutes one of the workers verified that 
the oil was flowing freely; the cover, on which one of 
® 
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the  mechanics  was  sitting,  was  then  blown off its 
mountings.  The  mechanic  was  gravely  Injured  and 
died the same day. 
Remarks 
(i)  All the cover clamping bows were sheared. 
(il)  The oil pressure in the tank is normally 4 bars. 
(Iii) The compressed air system has a pressure of ap-
proximately 7 bars. 
Measures taken 
(I)  Amended filter emptying procedure. 
(ii)  Pressure on filter feed restricted to 4 bars by pres-
sure governor. 
11. Railway accident 
A three-man transport team using a 300  hp light rail 
tractor was joining five empty wagons to a set of 13 
empty wagons previously positioned on  a  dead-end 
track (length of track about 200m, on a slight bend and 
slope). 
7 The guard saw that the first wagon was touching the 
buffer stop. After securing the set of wagons he ord-
ered the light rail tractor to uncouple and proceed to 
another track. 
He  then saw the set of wagons moving towards the 
points and engaging them (see  diagram). At that mo-
ment another light rail tractor (600 hp) and Its team ar-
rived. The guard told the driver to clear the points by 
shunting the last wagon. 
During this manoeuvre the wagon (light buffer) rose 
up,  under compression, against the engine hood of 
the fight rail tractor. 
The  two workers at the front of the fight rail tractor 
were  Injured.  One  had  his right leg  amputated, the 
Wagon  P22 
12. Interruption of compressed air 
supply to respirator 
Two  workers  from  an  external  firm,  wearing  com-
pressed air respirators, were finishing the assembly of 
their scaffolding In  No 6 blast furnace,  around 6-7m 
below the gap In the shell. 
Suddenly,  one  of  the  workers  realized  that  his  air 
supply had been cut off, quickly took off his respirator 
and, with the help of the other workers, left the blast 
furnace using the emergency ladder. He went down to 
the blast-furnace platform, where he  was given oxy-
gen and recovered. 
Medical diagnosis: 7% HbCO (carboxyhaemoglobln). 
Remark: At the time of the incident the air around the 
scaffold contained 500 ppm of CO. 
Explanations 
(I)  The blast furnace maintenance department had to 
change  the  compressed  air  tank  supplying  the 
taphole of No 6 blast furnace. Tho compressed air 
valve had to be shut off for this purpose. 
(II)  Closing  this valve  caused  the  air supply to the 
worker's respirator to be cut off. 
(Ill) Tho  second worker's respirator was not affected, 
as it was connected upstream from tho valve. 
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other suffered multiple contusions to the right leg and 
hlp and pelvic pain. 
Remnrks: 
The  wagons  were  set  In  motion  because  of  de-
compression of the buffer springs. 
Measures taken 
Short-term: 
Refresher  course  for  personnel  on  railway  safety 
regulations. 
Longer-term: 
Use of computer-supplied information on the possible 
placing of wagons on the tracks, with on-site verifica-
tion. 
Loco 472 
Action envisaged 
(a) Development of a compressed air reserve system, 
to which a respirator can be connected, in case of 
breakdown  or  Interruption  of  air  supply,  at  any 
point on tho main circuit. 
(1) The  above  should  be  fitted  with  an  acoustic 
alarm In order to alert the supervisory staff and 
enable them to evacuate tho personnel. 
(2) Regarding (a)  we can obtain a portable system 
which can  be  connected in all sections of the 
plant. 
The purpose of this reserve would be to permit the 
normal  evacuation  of  the  personnel  without 
breathing problems. 
(b) Introduction of a buffer tank with sufficient Inde-
pendent capacity to allow the personnel to be eva-
cuated (as above). 
Regarding  (b),  a  stationary buffer tank could  be 
used  where  a  large  number  of  persons  are 
employed, e.g. at the furnace top. 
(c) The  Committee  for  hygiene,  safety  and  working 
conditions would like the blast-furnace section to 
be equipped with a 'sanitary air' network which is 
Independent of the industrial air network. 1. Towards respirator 
2. Towards taphole of No 6 blast furnace 
3. Valvo shut off 
4. Towards 2nd respirator 
5. Compressed air 
13. Hook breakage during lifting 
operation 
Place: Slntorlng plant, premixing trammel. 
Operation:  Replacement  of a  half-sot of supporting 
drive wheels and trammel drive. 
Circumstances 
Tho  revolving  drum  was  lifted  and  placed  on  a 
purpose-designed cradle supported by two jacks. 
The  half-set  of wheels  (approximately  5t)  was  dis-
engaged from tho reduction gear side and from tho se-
cond half-set of drive wheels side. It was secured by 
placing a double rope sling 20mm in diameter around 
the middle; the sling was then attached to the lifting 
hook, which was fitted with a safety catch, chain holst 
and at gears. 
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1. Closed sling 
2. Coupling link 
3. Hook(3t) 
4. Return pulley 
5. Closed sling 
6. Holst 
7. Rope (4 strands) 
8. Traction rope 
9. Cradlo supporting trommel 
(2 x 50t jacks) 
The hoist is attached to a cable passing over a return 
pulley which is itself suspended by a hook attached to 
tho frame. The length of this cable is adjusted by a 3.5t 
traction  rope  secured  to  the  base  of  a  stay.  This 
system allows the chain hoist suspension height to be 
adjusted to the developed length and to permit access 
to the chain. 
When the half-set of wheels was lifted to slide It away 
from  the drum, the weight on  the chain caused tho 
operator to call a second person to assist him. 
After a few pulls the pulley and holst fell down, injur-
ing the shoulder of one of the men. 
Tho suspension hook of the return pulley had broken. 
It was a die-stamped hook on which a rated load of 3t 
was embossed. 
It emerged  from the discussions following the acci-
dent that few  people clearly understood that whilst 
the maximum hook load  was  3t,  in  the  case of tho 
operation concerned the load for each leg should be 
limited to half this figure, in other words the maximum 
load should not exceed 1.5t In order to adhere to the 
safety standards. 
Measures were taken to inform the personnel about 
tho problems of pulleys and lifting equipment. 
Every chain is only as strong as Its weakest link. 
14. Contact with overhead electric wire 
Atmospheric conditions were  bad  and  the  tempera-
ture was very low. One litre of fuel oil per tonne was 
added to tho ore to make wagon-emptying easier. 
In  order  to  check  the  state  of the  oro  and  take  a 
sample, a worker climbed Into the wagon, holding a 
metal bar around 3m  long. Suddenly there was an arc 
between the bar and the overhead wire carrying 25 000 
V.  The  worker  sustained  second  and  third-degree 
burns to his hands and feet. 
Action envisaged 
(i)  Issue of a reminder that no one is allowed to climb 
on  a  wagon  which  Is  standing  underneath  an 
overhead wire. 
(ii)  Introduction of new warning signs, including one 
with the text 'High voltage exceeding 1100 V-At· 
tentlon' (See p. 1  0.) 
15. How safety helmets can save lives 
Workers were engaged In replacing a full slag ladle by 
an  empty  one  underneath  the  platform  of  a  blast 
furnace. 
As they were doing this, one of the workers was struck 
on the helmet by a taphole drill bit and Its metal exten-
sion,  weighing  around  20kg.  The  helmet  was  pene-
trated,  but  the  worker  suffered  only a  slight  head-
ache. 
The  inquiry  revealed  that  a  furnaceman  had  appa-
rently checked that a slag ladle was there somewhat 
earlier; then, after working for a while, he had thrown 
the heavy piece of metal through the opening in  the 
platform  without  realizing  that  the  ladle  had  been 
taken away and that the piece of metal was likely to 
fall on someone's head. 
9 Action envisaged 
(i)  Updating  of existing regulations (in  particular a 
ban on throwing scrap into the slag ladles. 
(II)  Distribution of these  updated  regulations to the 
departments  concerned  and  comments  on  the 
regulations. 
(ill) Storing  of scrap  on  the  platform  of  No  1  blast 
furnace, with removal every two to three days. 
(lv) Installation  of  telephones  to  facilitate  commu-
nications  between  the  internal  transport  and 
furnace personnel. 
16. Loss of sight through failure to 
wear goggles 
Two workers had been instructed to change the Inter-
nal bearings of a roller. 
Finding that the roller-axle assembly would not come 
out of its bracket, one of the workers took a sledge-
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hammer and struck the base of the roller, whilst the 
second  stood  approximately 2m  back and  watched 
(without goggles). 
Suddenly, following a blow from the sledgehammer, a 
metal splinter flew from the roller and penetrated the 
left eye of the worker who was watching. 
Consequences: The worker lost the sight of his left 
eye. 
Action envisaged 
(i)  Modifications In  the design of the roller-axle as-
sembly so that It can be removed mechanically us-
Ing an extraction device or press. 
(li)  Workers  to  be  reminded  that  the  wearing  of 
goggles is recommended. 
(iii) Introduction of a notice warning of the dangers of 
metal-on-metal impact. 
(iv) Encouragement of the wearing of goggles, in col-
laboration with the safety and occupational health 
departments. 17. Worker electrocuted unplugging 
unearthed arc welding unit 
A worker employed by a firm was electrocuted as he 
unplugged  an  arc  welding  unit from  a 380  V power 
supply box.  Another unit belonging to another firm 
was plugged into a second socket on the supply box. 
Comments 
(i)  The  power supply box,  which was mounted on a 
concrete post, was fitted with two sockets and a 
circuit breaker with a 95-125 A thermal fuse. 
(il)  The electrical installations in  the section had re-
cently been checked by an authorized body. 
(iii) When the second firm's welding unit was checked, 
an insulation fault was found. 
When  Investigating  this  anomaly,  the  electricians 
found  that the cover of the fan  motor terminal  box, 
which should have been secured by three screws, had 
come loose and was in contact with the winding of the 
Internal transformer and with earth. 
A second check after removing this cover showed that 
the fault had disappeared. 
Possible explanation 
The short-circuit In the welding unit could have trans-
mitted the charge to power supply box. 
The  electrical  department  checked  the  earth  conti· 
nuity and found that: 
(i)  the earth continuity at the supply box showed too 
much  resistance  (the  supply  box  line  was  not 
connected to the equipotential line); 
(il)  the  220  V  lighting  circuit  for  the  section  was 
earthed. 
Action taken 
(i)  Direct  earthing  of  the  supply  box  (done  lmme· 
dlately). 
(ii)  Removal of the earthing fault in the lighting circuit 
(done immediately). 
(iii) Insulation of this electrical circuit from the lower 
BF sub-station and checking of earth continuity In 
this part of the circuit. 
(iv) Checking and marking of all 380 V sockets in the 
works. 
18. Near accident caused by imprecise 
radio message 
The  unit's radio  network consists of a base  station 
and N portable transmitter-receivers set to the same 
frequency.  Messages  are  therefore  received  by  all 
those In receive position. 
On  the day In question radio communication was to 
be used when replacing the lifting ropes of a travelling 
crane. 
On the ground, one team was supervising the unwind· 
ing of the ropes from the drums, whilst another was 
controlling the winding onto the lifting drums. 
At the same time a repair team was working on a trol-
ley. The trolley control was In  radio contact with the 
electricity sub-station. 
Everything was at stop when an order to 'start' came 
over the radio. 
The  mechanics on  the  crane  trolley  passed  on  the 
order to the  crane  operator,  who  started  the lifting 
mechanism. 
This led to urgent protests from the workers supervis-
ing the unwinding of the ropes, and succeeded in halt· 
ing the operation, thus preventing a serious accident. 
The order, given by the sub-station and carried out by 
the mechanics on the travelling crane, was in fact In· 
tended for the workers on the trolley. 
Such confusion Is always possible when several users 
are on  the same frequency, especially as the casual 
language used (start, try,  up,  down, stop, etc.) does 
not always enable the speaker to be identified. 
Action proposed 
A  standard  procedure Is  suggested which will  work 
only If the users adhere to it. The principles to be fol· 
lowed are: 
j The speaker must identify himself j 
X calling Y 
Y receiving X 
message from X 
Y acknowledges 
X ends the communication 
11 Measures for work under heat conditions 
by G.  Sonnenschein 
Maschlnenbau- und  Klelnelsenlndustrieberufsge-
nossenschaft, DOsseldorf {D) 
In  tho steel Industry there are a number of work sta-
tions where certain working processes cause heat ex-
posure  peaks  and  where  there  Is  heat  exposure 
throughout a shift. The  first question the safety en-
gineer has to ask Is whether the heat exposure can be 
reduced  by  technical  or engineering  measures  to a 
level  wlch  Is  acceptable  for  workers.  Only  when 
technical  measures  are  not  viable  should  ergono-
mic/organizational measures or Individual measures 
be taken. 
Technical measures can be  applied In  high effective 
temperatures to cool the working premises or to cool 
specific locations and/or to reduce Intense heat radla· 
tlon, to screen heat radiation by reflection and absorp· 
tlon or to reduce It by accelerated extraction of heat. 
(a) Technical measures to combat high temperatures: 
(I)  Ventilation 
Adequate ventilation  must  be  assured  In  hot 
working  areas.  Utilization  of the  temperature 
gradient  between  the  air  Inside  and  outside 
leads to a stack effect, which can be Intensified 
by means of suitable air Intakes and openings 
In the roof. 
(II)  Air conditioning 
Due to the high Investment and operating costs 
tho use of air conditioning Is only possible to a 
limited extent, for example, In control consoles 
and crane cabins In steelworks. 
(Ill) Air jets 
These can be used to create tolerable working 
conditions In  a limited area. The physiological 
benefit  Is  derived  from  the  cooling  action 
caused by more rapid evaporation of sweat. 
(b) Technical measures to combat Intense heat radia-
tion: 
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These  fall  Into three groups, namely reduction of 
radiation, screening of heat radiation by means of 
reflection  and  absorption,  and  accelerated  heat 
evacuation. Examples of technical methods used 
In tho presence of Intense heat radiation are given 
below: 
(I)  Water cooling of components radiating heat 
Surface Irrigation panels with open  or closed 
circuit  systems  can  be  used  to  reduce  heat 
radiation at work stations by 50% or more. 
(II)  Screening of heat radiation by reflection and 
absorption using glass heat shields 
Many observation and  control  activities In  In-
dustry must be  carried out In  areas which are 
subjected directly to heat  radiation, and  here 
glass  heat  shields  must  be  used.  There  are 
three types of glass heat shields on the market: 
absorption  shields,  reflection  shields  and  re-
flection shields with an  Insulating gap. These 
shields are available as single, double or triple-
pane configurations. Absorption shields are the 
least expensive and can be combined to form a 
twin-pane  arrangement  with  thermal  ventila-
tion; Ideally the gap should be 100mm. 
(Ill) Screening of heat radiation by reflection (wire 
gauze) 
A wire gauze screen functions by reflecting the 
heat rays  off the wire strands. Measurements 
demonstrate that the screening effect corres-
ponds almost exactly to the closed mesh area, 
I.e. when 40% of the area is screened by means 
of wire  gauze,  the  heat screening effect also 
amounts to approximately 40%. When  select-
Ing  the  wire  gauze,  a  compromise has  to be 
reached  between the protective effect and  ad-
equate visibility; for the latter gauze made from 
wire with a rectangular cross-section Is best. 
(lv) Screening  of  heat  radiation  by  protective 
shields 
Protective shielding should have a bright metal 
surface (free of oil or dirt) and should not reach 
to the floor (which would stop circulation of air 
between the shield and tho source of the heat 
rays).  Mobile heat shields are particularly use-
ful when repair work has to be carried out. 
(v)  Accelerated  heat  evacuation  using  water-
cooled working surfaces 
Round water-cooled platforms are for localized 
protection against heat and can,  for example, 
be used In soaking pits as a working surface for 
furnace  masons  to enable  repair  work  to  be 
carried out In the hot furnace. 
Ergonomic/organizational measures 
In  addition  to  the  technical  measures,  which,  as 
shown,  can  alleviate  heat  conditions  to  a  con· 
slderable  extent,  ways  of  optimizing  the  working 
sequence  should  be  considered,  if necessary by  In-
troducing organizational changes. 
This can, for example, Involve a reduction In the time 
spent In the hot area by relocating all activities which 
do not require the presence of the operator In tho hot 
area, or using tools to reduce muscular exertion. This, 
however, necessitates a detailed analysis of the place 
of work. If the conditions at the place of work cannot 
be  Improved  by  technical  or organizational  means, 
rest periods must be prescribed to protect the persons 
Involved  from  strain and  to ensure that they remain 
healthy. In hot areas a distinction must be made bet-
ween two different types of rest period, tho recovery 
period and the cooling period. 
Recovery period 
Stress and strain can be kept within tolerable limits by 
Interrupting  muscular  work  and  Introducing  a  so-
called recovery period. 
The following rules apply for recovery periods: 
A large number of rest periods are more effective from 
the point of view of recovery than fewer but longer rest 
periods. 
The  person Involved can remain  In  tho working area 
where heat exposure has occurred. Cooling period 
If the heat conditions arc so severe that workers can· 
not remain In the working area constantly, even when 
the muscular work Is reduced, I.e. when the strain can· 
not be reduced to tolerable levels by recovery periods, 
cooling periods must be prescribed. 
Cooling  periods  must  be  spent  in  areas  where  the 
climatic conditions are neutral or comfortable. 
A minimum cooling period of 10 minutes Is required. 
Personal protective measures 
If It  Is  Impossible  to  use  technical  and  ergonomic 
means of protection against accidents and  physical 
stress caused by the effects of heat at work, personal 
protective equipment must be used. 
In tho metal producing and processing Industry there 
are  many  working  areas  in  which  heat  protection 
equipment Is Indispensable. 
The  decision to use  protective clothing will depend 
primarily on  knowledge  of the effects of heat  rays, 
washing, dry cleaning, mechanical stress and metal 
and slag spattering, and the degree of comfort of the 
clothing with respect to ventilation, moisture and heat 
transfer. 
Wearing  protective  clothing  Imposes  considerable 
strain on  the wearer, as It increases energy expendi· 
ture and the pulse rate and impairs the feeling of well-
being; It is thus vital to take this Into consideration 
when deploying personnel. 
13 Reader's correspondence 
We  are grateful to a zealous reader who sent us the 
following Item. 
Stock yard 
During an  operation In  a stock yard, Involving the re-
moval of a 25mm plate measuring 4 m x 1 100m, a ma-
terials-handling  worker  was  trapped  between  two 
plates. 
The  accident  had  no  serious  consequences  but 
showed  that something  had  to be  done  to  improve 
working conditions. 
Tho original method of work 
A tyre-mounted crane was positioned near the storage 
rack.  One  materials-handling  worker  separated  the 
plate with a crow bar and  a wooden chock whereas 
the second one positioned the self-locking tongs on 
the plate and  subsequently attached it to the crane 
hook (Fig. 1). The crane driver instructed the two work-
ers to move away and  the plate was lifted from the 
rack. 
Changes Introduced 
(i)  The plate storage areas have been separated from 
the zones entered by the workers, which consist of 
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A worker climbs on to the rack to position the tongs whilst at 
risk from an overbalancing plate. 
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a  walkway  with  access  steps  and  railings.  The 
storage bay Is thus made up of sections into which 
plates are lowered separated by walkways (Figs 2 
and 3). 
(ii)  Toothed  holders  have  been  installed  in  each 
storage rack, so that the plates can be stored next 
to each other but with the top edges at different 
heights because of the slope of the notches, and 
can  thus  be  removed  individually  without  dif-
ficulty. 
Conclusions 
(i)  Operatives no longer enter the storage racks. 
(ii)  The plates are no longer difficult to separate from 
each other. 
(iii) Plates  can  be  removed  individually with  the  as-
sistance of only one worker on the ground, and he 
Is not exposed to any risk. 
If only we thought about situations before accidents 
happened,  how many practical improvements could 
be introduced! 
If you know of any interesting working methods which 
have been altered to reduce risks, please let us know 
about them via this bulletin. 
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The Idea Is to separate the storage part of the rack from the 
part entered by the worker In order to attach the self locking 
tongs, and to leave the plates positioned in such a way that 
they do not have to be separated. ~~--~----
r 
Fig. 3 (above) 
Each rack is allocated a specific size of plate, and is there· 
fore equipped with two·, three· or four· toothed plates. 
Fig. 4 (opposite) 
The  large plate rack; each plate is higher than the previous 
one so that the tongs can be attached directly. 
Fig. 5 
The'/, plates stored for direct removal. 
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Fig. 6 
Only one worker is now required to attach the tongs and he is 
not at risk from an overbalancing plate. 
15 Research projects 
The first allocation of financial aid available under tho fifth ECSC research programme on technical control of 
nuisances and pollution at tho place of work and  In  the environment of iron and stool works, adopted by tho 
Council of the European Communities In December 1985 (OJ C 338 of 31. 12. 1985)* was made to tho following 
research projects: 
Research Institute  Project No  Subject 
Centro sperlmontalo  7261·01/407/04  Pilot furnace study of nitrogen oxide emission 
metallurglco,  from reheallng furnaces and  of practicable 
Rome  remedial measures feasible for ECSC Industries 
CERCHAR,  7261·01/408/03  Emission of nitrogen oxides In coking plants 
Paris  - Study of their Impact on the environment 
Borgbau Forschung 
LECES 
CRM 
Societe beige do  7261·011409/02  Odour nuisance In the iron and steel and 
filtration,  coking Industries: Study of methods of prevention 
Louvaln·la-Neuve  and control techniques 
BCRA 
LECES 
Centre de recherches  7261·011410/02  Effect of the operational parameters 
metallurglques,  of Iron-ore slntoring plants on emission of sulphur and 
Liege  nitrogen oxides Into the atmosphere 
Bergbau-Forschung,  7261·011411/01  NO .omissions and associated ambient pollution 
Essen  in connection with the heating of coke ovens 
CRM 
lnstltut do recherches  7261·02/412/03  Chemical treatment for the specific 
hydrologiques,  destruction of cyanides 
Nancy 
CRM 
CEBEDEAU 
Centre beige d'etudes  7261·01/413/02  Chemical treatment for the specific 
et de documentation  destruction of cyanides 
de l'eau, 
Liege 
IRH 
CRM 
• Document  EUR  10338  In  extenso,  the  'Fifth  research  programme  on  technical  control  of  nuisances  and  pollution  at  the  place  of 
work and In the environment of Iron and stool works', may be obtained on request from the: 
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Commission of the European Communities, Directorate-General XIII-A-2, Room B 4/82, or 
Directorate-General V·E-2, Room C 4/89, 
Jean Monnet Building, BP 1907l-2920 luxembourg-Kirchberg This periodical is published in English, French, German and Italian, and can be obtained free of charge by simply 
applying to the Commission of the  European  Communities,  Directorate-General  XIII,  Division: Scientific and 
technical communication, L-2920 Luxembourg. 
Representatives of the following institutions collaborated in editing this bulletin: 
- Associazione industrie siderurgiche italiane 
Piazza Velasca 8,  1-20122 Milano 
- British Steel Corporation 
12 Addiscombe Road, Croydon CR9 3JH, England 
- Contact Office of Miners' and Metalworkers' Free Trade 
Unions in the European Communities 
58 avenue de Ia Liberte, L-1930 Luxembourg 
- Groupement des entreprises siderurgiques et minieres (GESIM) 
1 Rue Eugene Schneider, F-57016 Metz 
- Groupement des Hauts fourneaux et Acieries belges 
47 rue Montoyer, B-1040 Bruxelles 
- Wirtschaftsvereinigung Eisen- und Stahlindustrie 
Breite StraBe 69,  D-4000 Dusseldorf 1 
They were assisted by officials of the Commission of the European Communities from: 
-Directorate-General  for  Employment,  Social  Affairs  and  Education;  Directorate  E  - Division:  Industrial 
medicine and hygiene, 
-Directorate-General for Personnel and Administration; Medium and long-term translation service (Terminology 
bureau) 
-Directorate-General for Telecommunications, Information Industries and Innovation; Division: Scientific and 
technical communication .~  OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS 
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